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Abstract
In this paper, we address the open question: “What
do adversarially robust models look at?” Recently, it has
been reported in many works that there exists the trade-
off between standard accuracy and adversarial robustness.
According to prior works, this trade-off is rooted in the
fact that adversarially robust and standard accurate models
might depend on very different sets of features. However, it
has not been well studied what kind of difference actually
exists. In this paper, we analyze this difference through var-
ious experiments visually and quantitatively. Experimen-
tal results show that adversarially robust models look at
things at a larger scale than standard models and pay less
attention to fine textures. Furthermore, although it has been
claimed that adversarially robust features are not compati-
ble with standard accuracy, there is even a positive effect by
using them as pre-trained models particularly in low reso-
lution datasets.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have dramatically im-
proved the accuracy of various computer vision tasks. Es-
pecially in image classification, the top-5 error rate of
ResNet [23] reached 3.57% and already exceeded human
performance (5.1%) [45] on ImageNet [14]. On the other
hand, it is well known that even state-of-the-art DNNs [23,
65, 11, 18] are highly vulnerable to imperceptible and well-
sought perturbations, called adversarial examples [55]. The
existence of adversarial examples is an obstacle for the real
use of DNNs from the aspect of security, and the analysis
of this phenomenon is imperative.
Due to these strong demand, many works have addressed
it from various points of view [55, 22, 56, 46, 21]. As a
result of many efforts, many interesting findings of DNNs
have been accumulated in this area. One of them is that
training models to be robust to adversarial perturbations
leads to a reduction of standard accuracy [29, 31, 32, 53,
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Figure 1: We clarify the difference between the repre-
sentation obtained by adversarially trained and standard
trained models through various experiments. (a) Sensitiv-
ity map visualization of a standard trained (middle) and
an adversarially trained (right) ResNet-50 by guided back-
propagation [52]. While the both models are sensitive to
strong edges, the adversarilly trained one does not react to
fine textures. (b) Layer visualization [16] of the standard
trained (top row) and the adversarially trained (bottom row)
ResNet-50. Each column represents the same depth visual-
ization. Visualization results suggest that the adversarially
trained model tries to capture larger scale patterns than the
standard trained model.
59]. This phenomenon is contrary to the simple expecta-
tion [57, 22, 34] that training on adversarial examples as
ultimate form of data augmentation can improve general-
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ization performance in the standard classification. Tsipras
et al. [59] suggested that this trade-off is caused by the fact
that adversarially trained models obtain fundamentally dif-
ferent feature representations than standard trained models.
Therefore, analyzing the features acquired by the adversar-
ially trained models and clarifying what features are used
for their decision making are useful not only for designing
stronger defense methods but also for a better understanding
of the phenomenon of adversarial perturbations. However,
the nature of the feature representations acquired by adver-
sarially trained models has not been sufficiently elucidated
yet. In this work, we reveal the property of the adversarially
robust features through comprehensive experiments and vi-
sualizations (Figure 1).
our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We reveal that adversarially robust features look at
things at a larger scale than standard models and pay
less attention to fine textures through various visual-
ization methods and quantitative evaluations where we
expose them to various artificial transformations.
• We conduct a comprehensive study on various datasets
to reveal how adversarially robust features are bene-
ficial for improving standard accuracy and show that
they are useful as pre-trained models and especially
have a positive effect on accuracy in low resolution
datasets.
To promote reproducible research, we will release our
code including reimplementation of multiple adversarial at-
tacks and tools for visualizing CNN.
2. Related Work
2.1. Trade-off Between Robustness and Accuracy
So far, various defense methods [22, 44, 12, 33, 34, 58,
38] have been proposed against attack methods [22, 37, 43,
8, 30, 36, 32, 51, 3, 35]. However, most of them were sub-
sequently shown to be ineffective [7, 2, 60] and adversarial
training [22, 32], which is the simplest one, seems to be
most effective so far. Unfortunately, it has been reported
in many works that standard accuracy has to be sacrificed to
train adversarially robust models [29, 17, 15, 62, 53, 32, 64].
Fawzi et al. [17] proved upper bounds of the adversarial ro-
bustness of classifiers and exhibited the trade-off between
standard accuracy and adversarial robustness for a specific
classifier families on a synthetic task. Su et al. [53] con-
ducted a comprehensive experiment on 18 different net-
work architectures that are submitted to ImageNet Chal-
lenge [45], and empirically showed that the higher accu-
racy models are, the more vulnerable to adversarial pertur-
bations. Tsipras et al. [59] exhibited that the feature rep-
resentations need to achieve high adversarial robustness are
different from those need to achieve high standard accuracy,
and suggested that this difference is the main cause of the
trade-off between adversarial robustness and standard accu-
racy.
2.2. Interpretation of Deep Neural Networks
Explaining classification decisions could potentially
shed light on the underlying mechanisms of blackbox sys-
tems like DNNs. Due to this potential, various types of vi-
sualization and analysis methods have been proposed [16,
66, 52, 4, 54, 50, 48, 47].
The simplest idea is visualizing each layer of trained
CNNs directly. While the first layer can be visualized
straightforwardly, it is hard to visualize deeper layers be-
cause of the large number of their dimensions. Erhan et
al. [16] calculated the input which maximizes the activation
of the layer of interest by gradient ascent. Zeiler et al. [66]
projected the feature activations back to the input space by
using deconvolutional network [67] which consists of un-
pooling and deconvolution.
Instead of visualizing layers directly, there is an ap-
proach to create a map that reasons where in the input
image contribute to the classifier’s decision. Simonyan et
al. [49] proposed “sensitivity map” by propagating the out-
put of the target class backward, but this simple backprop-
agation leads to noisy results. To make the sensitivity map
clearer, Springenberg et al. [52] proposed guided backprop-
agation technique that impose restrictions to the gradient
and Smilkov et al. [50] proposed SmoothGrad that aver-
ages results of multiple noise added inputs. These pixel-
space gradient visualization methods are high-resolution
and highlight fine-grained details in the image, but are not
class-discriminative. To localize the class-specific discrim-
inative regions in exchange for its resolution, various meth-
ods to generate “class activation map” have been proposed
(e.g., CAM [68], Grad-CAM [47] and Grad-CAM++ [10]).
The sensitivity map and the class activation map are often
used together to compensate for each other drawbacks.
In contrast to the visualization-based analysis, there are
some works which try to elucidate the decision process of
networks by investigating the reaction to architecture mod-
ifications or peculiar inputs. Brendel et al. [6] proposed a
variant of the ResNet-50 architecture called BagNet which
imitates the traditional bag-of-feature (BoF) classifiers and
claimed that there is no much difference between decision
making mechanism of modal DNN classifier and that of tra-
ditional BoF classifier on the basis of that BagNet achieved
comparable accuracy as state-of-the art deep neural net-
works. Geirhos et al., [19] generated images whose tex-
ture is replaced by other ones while maintain the composi-
tion and outline using style transfer, and reveals that typical
CNN classifiers decisions are biased towards texture infor-
mation.
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3. Preliminaries
3.1. Adversarial Examples
Although various types of adversarial examples have
been proposed as described in the previous section, here-
inafter adversarial examples refer to perturbation-based
ones unless otherwise noted. Given a K-class classifier
f : Rd → RK and a pair of a data point x ∈ Rd and
a ground-truth label t, the predicted label is obtained by
kˆ(x) = arg maxkfk(x), where fk(x) is the k-th compo-
nent of f(x) that corresponds to the k-th class. A set of
adversarial perturbations is defined as follows:{
δ ∈∆
∣∣∣ kˆ(x+ δ) 6= t} , (1)
where ∆ ⊂ Rd is a set of perturbations. Practically, an
adversarial perturbation δ ∈ Rd is given by the following
optimization problem:
max
δ∈∆
L(kˆ(x+ δ), t), (2)
where L is a loss function, e.g., the cross-entropy loss. In
this paper, we focus on the case when ∆ is the set of `p-
bounded perturbations, i.e. ∆ =
{
δ ∈ Rd ∣∣ ‖δ‖p ≤ ε}.
3.2. Adversarial Attack Methods
Here, we introduce two simple first-order methods that
we use for adversarial training and robustness evaluation in
this paper.
Fast Gradient Sign Method. One of the simplest meth-
ods to generate adversarial examples is fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) [22] which is a fast single-step attack by
maximizing the loss function in the linear approximation.
The perturbation by FGSM is calculated as follows:
δ = ε · sign(∇xL(kˆ(x), y)). (3)
Projected Gradient Descent. Projected gradient descent
method (PGD) [31, 32] is the iterative variant of FGSM.
The perturbation by PGD at a time step t + 1 is calculated
as follows:
δ(t+1) = Pε(δ(t) + α · sign(∇xL(kˆ(x+ δ(t)), t))), (4)
where α denotes a single step size and Pε(·) denotes the
projection onto the `p-ball of radius ε.
3.3. Adversarial Training
One of the most popular defense approaches is adversar-
ial training [22, 32], which generates adversarial examples
to the original training data during the training stage. Let
us consider a classification task with underlying data distri-
bution D. The goal of standard training is often formulated
as finding parameters θ of the classifier f to minimize the
expectation of the loss function:
min
θ
E
(x,t)∼D
[
L(kˆ(x), t)
]
. (5)
On the contrary, the goal of adversarial training is formu-
lated to minimize the expectation of the adversarial loss:
min
θ
E
(x,t)∼D
[
max
δ∈∆
L(kˆ(x+ δ), t)
]
. (6)
Although adversarial training is effective, this leads to an in-
crease of the training time. Therefore, more efficient ways
of adversarial attacks and adversarial defenses are being
sought.
3.4. Visualization Methods
In this section, we introduce several visualization meth-
ods that we use in our experiments. All these methods use
the gradient information via backpropagation because neu-
ral networks are differentiable. The difference from the
training stage is that the optimization is performed on the
input with the classifier’s parameters fixed.
Vanilla Gradient. Vanilla gradient (Vanilla Grad) is the
simplest sensitivity map that calculates the gradient of the
classifier output for the ground-truth label with respect to
the input as follows:
Svanilla(x) = ∇xft(x). (7)
The sensitivity map by Vanilla Grad tends to be noisy as
shown in Figure 2.
Loss Gradient. Loss gradient (Loss Grad), used in [59],
calculates the gradient of the loss function instead of the
classifier output in Vanilla Grad as follows:
Sloss(x) = ∇xL(kˆ(x), t). (8)
Especially in the classification task, the cross entropy loss
is often used as the loss function, in which case Equation 8
is as follows:
Sloss(x) = −∇x log
(
exp ft(x)∑K
k=1 exp fk(x)
)
= −∇xft(x) +
K∑
k=1
yk(f(x))∇xfk(x), (9)
where y(·) is the softmax function. The first term is the
negative of Vanilla Grad and the second term contains the
information other than the ground-truth label.
Guided Backpropagation.1 Compared to Vanilla Grad
and Loss Grad, guided backpropagation (Guided Back-
prop) [52] set all the negative gradients to 0 like the ReLU
1Adebayo et al. [1] pointed out that Guided Backprop is misleading
because of its independence on the model parameters, but we could not
confirm this phenomenon. In detail, we discuss this problem in supple-
mentary materials.
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Architecture Setting Top-1 Acc [%] Top-5 Acc [%] Robustness Acc [%]
ε = 0.005 ε = 0.01
AlexNet STD 58.28± 0.18 80.60± 0.05 2.48± 0.18 0.22± 0.07ADV 50.59± 0.22 73.73± 0.07 71.55± 0.12 46.49± 0.04
ResNet-50 STD 75.84± 0.31 92.74± 0.14 0.78± 0.03 0.17± 0.02ADV 71.52± 0.06 90.02± 0.03 81.25± 0.09 60.75± 0.33
Table 1: Results of standard accuracy and adversarial robustness on ImageNet in standard training and adversarial training
settings. We used `∞-PGD attack for robustness evaluation. There exists the trade-off between standard accuracy and
robustness accuracy in both AlexNet and ResNet-50.
Vanilla Grad Loss Grad Guided Backprop
Inputs
Figure 2: Visualization results of the sensitivity maps of standard trained (top row) and adversarially trained (bottom row)
ResNet-50 by Vanilla Grad, Loss Grad and Guided Backprop [52]. Additional results are shown in the supplementary
materials.
function in order to focus on what kind of feature the neu-
rons detect than what they do not detect. As a result of per-
forming this operation, the sensitivity map becomes clearer
than Vanilla Grad and Loss Grad as shown in Figure 2.
Deeper Layer Visualization. Erhan et al. [16] proposed
a method to synthesize an input that maximizes the acti-
vation of a layer of interest without searching for an input
pattern from the datasets. Given a i-th filter of a l-th layer,
the synthesized input x∗ is given by solving the following
optimization problem via gradient ascent:
x∗ = arg max
x∈Rd
a
(l)
i (x), (10)
where a(l)i is sum of the activations of the i-th filter of the
l-th layer.
4. Experiments
First, we conducted standard and adversarial training
several times from scratch for AlexNet [27] (with batch nor-
malization [24]) and ResNet-50 [23] on ImageNet. Then
we used the momentum stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
method for 90 epochs and set the momentum value to 0.9,
the batch size to 256, and the initial learning rate to 0.1. The
learning rate is multiplied by 0.1 for each 30 epochs. In ad-
versarial training, we used `∞-FGSM attack ( = 0.005).
Hereafter, standard training and adversarial training are
abbreviated as STD and ADV respectively in tables and fig-
ures. Table 1 shows results of standard accuracy and ro-
bustness accuracy (defense success rate against adversar-
ial attacks) on ImageNet in standard training and adver-
sarial training settings. We can confirm the trade-off be-
tween standard accuracy and adversarial robustness, similar
to prior works [53, 59].
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Figure 3: Deeper layer visualization of standard trained and adversarially trained models. Four samples are randomly picked
from each convolution layer.
AlexNet ResNet-50 ResNet-101
Figure 4: First layer visualization [16] of the standard
trained (top row) and the adversarially trained (bottom row)
models on ImageNet.
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Figure 5: Example images that are applied with Gaussian
blur and median filter.
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(b) Median Filter
Figure 6: Results of standard accuracy on ImageNet applied
with Gaussian blur and median filter. Filled regions mean
the difference between standard trained models and adver-
sarially trained models (Orange means that standard trained
models exceed and blue means that adversarially trained
models exceed). Both models are trained on standard Im-
ageNet (without fine-tuning).
4.1. What Do Adversarially Robust Features See?
To visualize the differences between standard accurate
and adversarially robust features, we calculated the sensi-
tivity maps of both the standard trained and the adversari-
ally trained models by Vanilla Grad, Loss Grad and Guided
Backprop and the results of ResNet-50 are shown in Fig-
ure 2. Vanilla and Loss Grad of the adversarial trained
model are more perceivable for humans as previous works
reported. On the other hand, in the results of Guided Back-
prop, both models are correctly capturing the features of the
main objects in the input images, but it can be seen that the
adversarially trained model does not respond to the fine tex-
ture (e.g., the wing of the insect and the hair of the dog).
Next, we performed layer visualization and the results
are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. It can be confirmed
that the values of the first layers of the adversarially trained
models are smaller than that of the standard trained ones to
be insensitive to weak edges and textures. The deeper layers
of the standard trained model have the small color clutter-
ing that cannot be confirmed in those of the adversarially
trained model. Furthermore, it can be seen that the adver-
sarially trained model captures an obviously larger structure
than the standard trained model.
In order to confirm this fact quantitatively, we added
some artificial transformations to the validation set of Ima-
geNet and investigated changes in accuracy of the standard
trained and the adversarially trained models. As artificial
transformations, we applied Gaussian blur and median filter
to reduce the spatial information, color reversal to modify
the color information and stylization by style transfer tech-
niques to change the texture while keeping the edge and sil-
houette information as Geirhos et al. [19] did. In the Gaus-
sian blur setting, we set the kernel size to 7 and changed the
value of σ from 0 to 5 in increments of 0.25. In the median
filter setting, we set the kernel size to 5 and changed the
number of times to apply the median filter from 0 to 5.
The example images and the results of the Gaussian blur
and the median filter settings are represented in Figure 5
and Figure 6, respectively. In the Gaussian blur setting, the
accuracy of both models decreases while maintaining the
difference of their accuracy. On the other hand, in the me-
dian filter setting, the adversarially trained model outper-
form the standard trained one as the times of median filter
increases. This tendency can be confirmed in both AlexNet
and ResNet-50. This results suggest that the adversarially
trained model uses stronger edges such as the silhouette
information of objects rather than the detailed texture in-
formation, since the Gaussian blur makes all edges blurry
equally while the median filter only removes weak edges
and noise.
Next, Table 2 shows the result of applying color reversal
and style transfer. Although, in color reversal setting, the
same range of accuracy reductions were observed in both
models, the accuracy of adversarial trained model exceeded
standard trained one in Stylized ImageNet. Since Stylized
ImageNet stylizes the texture inside the objects, it suggests
that the adversarially trained models make shape based de-
cisions rather than texture comparing to the standard trained
models. Following the fact that humans are able to achieve
high accuracy using only the silhouette information as re-
ported by Geirhos et al. [19], these results follows the re-
port of Tsipras et al. [59] that adversarially trained models
are better align to human perception than standard trained
ones.
4.2. Benefits of Adversarially Robust Features
As described above, standard accurate and adversarially
robust models obtain different sets of features. This result
induces our next simple question: “Can adversarially ro-
bust features be utilized to improve accuracy by combining
with standard accurate features?” To answer this question,
we performed ensemble learning with combination of stan-
dard trained and adversarially trained models as pre-trained
models three times for 10 datasets (Table 3). We employed
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Architecture Setting Metric Variants of ImageNetStandard Reversed Stylized
AlexNet
STD Top-1 Acc [%] 55.28± 0.18 13.18± 0.17 4.20± 0.06Top-5 Acc [%] 80.60± 0.05 28.88± 0.35 10.74± 0.15
ADV Top-1 Acc [%] 50.59± 0.22 7.97± 0.11 5.07± 0.04Top-5 Acc [%] 73.73± 0.07 19.09± 0.23 11.86± 0.10
ResNet-50
STD Top-1 Acc [%] 75.84± 0.31 32.36± 0.77 6.90± 0.22Top-5 Acc [%] 92.74± 0.14 56.61± 0.87 15.52± 0.23
ADV Top-1 Acc [%] 71.52± 0.06 23.26± 0.14 11.08± 0.26Top-5 Acc [%] 90.02± 0.03 43.01± 0.42 21.89± 0.32
Table 2: Results of standard accuracy on variants of ImageNet. All the models are trained on standard ImageNet (without
fine-tuning). Reversed variant reverses pixel values around mean values of ImageNet ([R,G,B] = [0.485, 0.456, 0.406]).
Stylized variant uses Stylized ImageNet [19]. Example images of each variant are shown in the supplementary materials.
Dataset # Pixel # Class # Train
SVHN [39] 32 10 73, 257
CIFAR-10 [28] 32 10 50, 000
CIFAR-100 [28] 32 100 50, 000
Tiny ImageNet [63] 64 200 100, 000
STL-10 [13] 96 10 5, 000
Food-101 [5] ≈ 549 101 75, 750
Flower-102 [41] ≈ 583 102 1, 020
Stanford Dogs [25] ≈ 414 120 12, 000
CUB-200 [61] ≈ 426 200 5, 994
ImageNet [14] ≈ 460 1, 000 1, 281, 167
Table 3: Information of datasets for image classification.
The number of pixels are the average values of all the im-
ages of the validation sets.
the late fusion scheme that merges two classifiers in the last
layer. Then, we trained models for 30 epochs with the learn-
ing rate 0.001 and set the other parameters to the same as de-
scribed above. For fair comparison, we also trained not only
plain models without ensemble learning (STD, ADV) but
also the ensemble models of two different standard trained
models (STD+STD) and that of two different adversarially
trained models (ADV+ADV).
Figure 7 shows the results of ensemble learning for
AlexNet and ResNet-50. As can be seen from the results,
the STD+ADV models outperform the plain STD and plain
ADV models in most datasets. On the other hand, the
STD+STD models tend to be more accurate for the high res-
olution datasets (e.g., STL-10, Food-101, Flower-102, Stan-
ford Dogs, CUB-200 and ImageNet) and the ADV+ADV
models for the low resolution datasets (e.g., SVHN, CIFAR-
10, CIFAR-100, Tiny ImageNet) While the the accuracy of
the STD+STD and ADV+ADV models fluctuate depend-
ing on the resolution of the datasets, the STD+ADV mod-
els show the comparable accuracy to the highest-accurate
models in all the datasets. These results indicate that the
STD+ADV models obtain resolution-invariant features and
see the inputs at various scales. From the above, it has been
considered that the adversarial training has contradictory to
the accuracy, but we clarified that both standard accurate
and adversarially robust features can be used to improve the
accuracy.
5. Discussion
Through various experiments, we confirmed that adver-
sarially trained models pay attention to larger scale patterns
and stronger edges rather than fine textures. Here, we would
like to further consider that the visualization results of ad-
versarially trained models suggest. On the first layer vi-
sualization in Figure 4, both the standard trained and the
adversarially trained models basically obtained similar pat-
terns, but there exist two crucial differences. The first one
is, as aforementioned in Section 4.1, the values of adversari-
ally trained ones are smaller than standard trained ones. The
other noticeable difference is that grid-like or checkerboard-
like patterns appear in the adversarially trained models (see
the enlarged images placed at the bottom left corners in Fig-
ure 4). The shape of the patterns appear in ResNet-50 and
ResNet-101 looks similar although that of AlexNet is differ-
ent. These observations might suggest that to some extent
these patterns depend on the model architecture and become
a clue to explain why adversarial examples are well trans-
ferred in the same architecture family as reported in [53].
As future works, we will analyze this result in detail and ap-
ply it to construct more effective defense methods or strong
perturbations which have high transferability.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we address an open question: “What do
adversarially robust models look at?” and provided the vi-
sual and the quantitative evidence that adversarially robust
models looks at things at a larger scale than standard accu-
rate models. Furthermore, we showed empirically that both
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(b) ResNet-50
Figure 7: Learning curves of AlexNet and ResNet-50 on 10 datasets. The solid lines mean ensemble models and the dashed
lines mean models without ensemble learning.
standard trained and adversarially trained features are use-
ful for improving accuracy contrary to the previous reports
that adversarial robustness decreases the accuracy. From
this result, we believe that adversarially robust features may
also be useful in improving the accuracy of tasks other than
classification (e.g., surface normal estimation and keypoint
detection) and analyzing them may give clues not only to
devise effective defense methods against adversarial per-
turbations but also to clarify the blackbox mechanisms of
DNNs. Like these, exploring the potential of adversarially
robust features is our future work.
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A. Sanity Checks of Model Parameters Depen-
dence
In the main paper, we used some visualization methods
to confirm visually the difference between feature represen-
tations of standard trained models and those of adversar-
ially trained ones. While visualization is one of the very
important ways to explain the predictions of DNNs, some
recent works claimed that a part of them lacks the theoreti-
cal background and does not explain the network decisions
correctly.
In particular, guided backpropagation [52], one of the vi-
sualization methods we used, has been shown to lack class-
discriminability [68, 47, 40]. However, the lack of this class
dependence does not matter in achieving our goal of clari-
fying the difference between what the models look at. On
the other hand, Adebayo et al. [1]2 pointed out the problem
that sensitivity maps by guided backpropagation are inde-
pendent on the model parameters, and this problem is criti-
cal for our goal. Thus, in this section, we conduct the san-
ity check of this model parameters independence for var-
ious visualization methods and experimental results show
that guided backpropagation has the model parameters de-
pendence unlike their results [1]. We release our code3 for
reproducibility of our experiments.
Besides this, other desirable characteristics as the attri-
bution methods have been discussed in many works [68,
26, 20, 47, 54, 40]. Note that we agree their view that re-
liance solely on visual assessment can be misleading, and
also confirmed that our claim is correct via several quanti-
tative experiments in the main paper.
A.1. Mathematical Formulation
In this section, we introduce several visualization meth-
ods that we use in our sanity checks. There are some parts
that overlap with the main paper, but they are written again
to make this supplementary material self-contained. The
element-wise product of the input and the gradient (con-
verted to gray-scale) is often used to reduce visual illegi-
bility, but we use the raw gradients here because the color
information of the gradients can be also important. There-
fore we omit the element-wise product in the formulations
accordingly.
Given a K-class classifier f : Rd → RK and a pair of a
data point x ∈ Rd and a ground-truth label t, the predicted
label is obtained by kˆ(x) = arg maxkfk(x), where fk(x)
is the k-th component of f(x) that corresponds to the k-th
class.
Vanilla Gradient. Vanilla gradient calculates the gradient
of the classifier output of the ground-truth label with respect
2Their GitHub page (https://github.com/adebayoj/
sanity_checks_saliency) exists, but it has no implementations.
3https://github.com/anonymous-author-iccv2019/
sanity_checks
to the input as follows:
Svanilla(x) = ∇xft(x). (11)
Loss Gradient. Loss gradient calculates the gradient of the
loss with respect to the input as follows:
Sloss(x) = ∇xL(kˆ(x), t). (12)
Guided Backpropagation. [52] Guided backpropagation
set all the negative gradients to 0 like the ReLU func-
tion. We consider the i-th ReLU activation in the l-th
layer with its input y(l)i and its output o
(l)
i , and denote
σ(t) = max(t, 0) the ReLU activation. In the gradient cal-
culation, the forward ReLU is formally defined as follows:
σ
(l)
f,i(t) = I(y
(l)
i )t (13)
where I(·) is the indicator function, and the backward ReLU
is formally defined as follows:
σ
(l)
b,i(t) = I(R
(l)
i )t (14)
where R(l)i is the top gradient before activation, i.e., gra-
dient of the output score with respect to o(l)i . Then, the
(modified) gradient after activation T (l)i , i.e., gradient of the
output score with respect to y(l)i is given as follows:
T
(l)
i =
{
σ
(l)
f,i(R
(l)
i ) (vanilla gradient)
σ
(l)
f,i(σ
(l)
b,i(R
(l)
i )) (guided backpropagation).
(15)
SmoothGrad. [50] In order to avoid noisy results, Smooth-
Grad average the gradients with respect to the multiple
noise added input as follows:
Ssmooth(x) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
∇xft(x+N (0, σ2)) (16)
where N is the number of samples andN (0, σ2) represents
Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ.
Integrated Gradient. [54] Integrated gradient accumulates
the gradients at all points along the path between the input
x and the baseline x′ as follows:
Sintegrated(x) =
∫ 1
α=0
∇xft(x′ + α(x− x′))dα. (17)
A.2. Experimental Results and Discussion
We performed aforementioned visualization methods on
randomly initialized, standard trained and adversarially
trained models for ResNet-50 and ResNet-101 as shown
in Figure 8 - 12. As it can be seen in Figure 10, guided
backpropagation leads to very different visualization re-
sults when the model parameters are different, similar to
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other visualization methods. Therefore, it can be concluded
that guided backpropagation has “model parameters depen-
dence” and this phenomenon has been also confirmed in the
previous report [40].
In addition, we can see that guided backpropagation is
the best suited to determine whether the models look at fine
textures or not. This can be thought to be due to the strong
ability of guide backpropagation to generate clearer outputs.
Nie et al. [40] proved theoretically that guided backprop-
agation recovers the input images on randomly initialized
models, and highlight more relevant pixels when the model
parameters are strongly biased via training, as can be con-
firmed in Figure 10. We believe that it is necessary to com-
pare with an appropriate baseline, rather than judge them
independently, especially when using powerful visualiza-
tion methods like guided backpropagation. The need for
a baseline is also stated in the existing work [54]. In fact,
comparing the results in models with different parameters
led to helpful clues to assess their characteristics.
Some people may think it strange that the results on ran-
domly initialized models are human-interpretable in almost
visualization methods. This phenomenon can be thought to
be rooted in the local connectivity of CNNs. Noroozi et
al. [42] reported that AlexNet can achieve 12% accuracy
in ImageNet (the chance rate is 0.01%) by training only
the fully connected layers even though the parameters of
all convolutional layers are fixed with random initialization
(from a Gaussian distribution). Based on this strong prior,
Caron et al. [9] proposed an unsupervised learning method
by clustering iteratively deep features and using these clus-
ter assignments as pseudo-labels to learn the parameters of
the convolution part. Therefore, this phenomenon is not the
result of the defects of visualization methods and is due to
the potential of CNNs.
B. Additional Sensitivity Map Visualization
We provide more visualization results of the sensitivity
maps of standard trained and adversarially trained networks
(AlexNet and ResNet-50). The input images are randomly
chosen from the ImageNet dataset. As we can see, all the
results (Figure 13 and Figure 14) are consistent with our
previous empirical observations that adversarially trained
models look at things at a larger scale than standard models
and pay less attention to fine textures.
C. Additional Deeper Layer Visualization
In this section, we provide additional deeper layer visu-
alizations [16] of standard trained and adversarially trained
models (Figures 15 - 19). All results are randomly selected
from the indicated convolutional layers. As we can see,
deeper layers of adversarially trained models capture ob-
viously larger structures than the standard trained models.
D. Example Images of Variants on ImageNet
Here we provide some example images of variants on
ImageNet that are used in our experiments. In Figure 20 and
Figure 21, we represent some examples of stylized variants
of ImageNet that are generated in the same way as Styl-
ized ImageNet [19]. As we can see, after applying style
transfer, local texture cues are no longer highly predictive
of the target class, although the global shapes and strong
edges tend to be retained. Next, we provide the sample im-
ages that applied with Gaussian blur and median filter in
Figure 22. While the edges in Gaussian blurred images be-
come blurry equally, the median filter only removes weak
edges and noise. Figure 22 also includes example images
of color reversed variant of ImageNet.
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Inputs ResNet-50 ResNet-101
Random Standard Adversarial Random Standard Adversarial
Figure 8: Visualization results of the sensitivity maps by Vanilla Gradient.
13
Inputs ResNet-50 ResNet-101
Random Standard Adversarial Random Standard Adversarial
Figure 9: Visualization results of the sensitivity maps by Loss Gradient.
14
Inputs ResNet-50 ResNet-101
Random Standard Adversarial Random Standard Adversarial
Figure 10: Visualization results of the sensitivity maps by Guided Backpropagation.
15
Inputs ResNet-50 ResNet-101
Random Standard Adversarial Random Standard Adversarial
Figure 11: Visualization results of the sensitivity maps by SmoothGrad.
16
Inputs ResNet-50 ResNet-101
Random Standard Adversarial Random Standard Adversarial
Figure 12: Visualization results of the sensitivity maps by Integrated Gradient.
17
Inputs Vanilla Grad Loss Grad Guided Backprop
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Figure 13: Additional visualization results of the sensitivity maps of AlexNet.
18
Inputs Vanilla Grad Loss Grad Guided Backprop
Standard Adversarial Standard Adversarial Standard Adversarial
Figure 14: Additional visualization results of the sensitivity maps of ResNet-50.
19
Standard Adversarial
Figure 15: Deeper layer visualization of AlexNet.
20
Standard Adversarial
Figure 16: Additional deeper layer visualization of ResNet-50 (from conv 9 to 24).
21
Standard Adversarial
Figure 17: Additional deeper layer visualization of ResNet-50 (from conv 29 to 49).
22
Standard Adversarial
Figure 18: Additional deeper layer visualization of ResNet-101 (from conv 9 to 49).
23
Standard Adversarial
Figure 19: Additional deeper layer visualization of ResNet-101 (from conv 59 to 99).
24
Inputs Stylized Images
Figure 20: Example images of Stylized ImageNet. We randomly selected 14 different styles for each input image.
25
Inputs Stylized Images
Figure 21: Example images of Stylized ImageNet. We randomly selected 14 different styles for each input image.
26
ReversedInputs Gaussian Bulr Median Filter
=1.0 5 times= 2.0 = 3.0 1 time 3 times
Figure 22: Example images of blurred variant (Gaussian blur and median filter) and color reversed variant of ImageNet.
27
